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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SCENARIO is all too common: a pilot completes flightschool or transition training and is eager to show off his or
her new skills. Predictably, the pilot quickly gets in over his or
her head, crashes, and causes injury or death. The bulk of the
fault appears to lie with the pilot. But, what about the parties
who undertook to train the pilot? Can they be held responsible
for the occurrence of this accident? In essence, this is a claim
sounding in educational malpractice.
Typically, educational malpractice claims boil down to a sim-
ple argument: the pilot was not taught what he needed to know
to be able to safely fly the aircraft.' In these cases, the plaintiffs
claim that their injury was proximately caused by the flight
school or seller's negligence in instructing the pilot in general
or specific skills necessary to prevent the accident. Flight instruc-
tion and pilot training pose an interesting subset of the issues
presented in cases sounding in general educational malpractice.
These claims present thorny questions regarding the judiciary's
ability to properly assess the sufficiency of a particular course of
education. Recovery on such claims is surprisingly difficult.
Not surprisingly, the cases from around the country examin-
ing the conduct of flight schools and other providers of pilot
training have arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions. In
order to understand this tension, it is important to look at the
nature and history of educational malpractice claims in general
and examine the reasons why they are traditionally disfavored
I Educational malpractice claims can actually fall into three categories: (1) the
student alleges that the school failed to provide him with adequate skills; (2) the
student alleges that the school negligently diagnosed or failed to diagnose his or
her learning or developmental disabilities; and (3) the school negligently super-
vised his training. See Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 113 (iowa 1986). This
article focuses on the first category of claim: that the educator failed to provide
the student with adequate skills. The other types of educational malpractice
claims involving failure to diagnose learning disabilities or negligent supervision
of training are conceptually different and are beyond the scope of this article.
Although claims involving negligent supervision of training can and do arise in
the aviation world, these actions are really a traditional negligence action exam-
ining the reasonableness of an educator's actions in protecting students from
known physical risks while still participating in the course of education. See Linam v.
Murphy, 232 S.W.2d 937, 942-43 (Mo. 1950) (flight instructor crashes plane dur-
ing instructional flight); see also Farish v. Canton Flying Servs., 58 So. 2d 915, 918
(Miss. 1952) (finding flight school negligent when it knew student pilot was un-
qualified, but let him take plane for solo flight anyway); DeRienzo v. Morristown
Airport Corp., 146 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1958) (finding flight school negligent in al-
lowing student pilot to take-off alone while controls were locked in place).
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before comparing and contrasting the cases involving aviation
instruction.
II. ELEMENTS OF AN EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIM
No matter what language the plaintiffs use to frame their
claim, any time the court is asked to measure the quality of edu-
cation or evaluate the reasonableness of an educator's conduct,
the claim is properly characterized as one of educational mal-
practice.2 In Vogel v. Maimonides Academy of Western Connecticut,
Inc., the court determined that a claim that defendant breached
a duty to educate effectively sounds in educational malpractice.'
In Lawrence v. Lorain County Community College, it was determined
that any claim that the educational services provided were inade-
quate, substandard, or ineffective constitutes a claim of educa-
tional malpractice.' In Andre v. Pace University, the court
commented that whenever it is asked to evaluate the course of
instruction or the soundness of the method of teaching that has
been adopted by an institution, that claim sounds in educational
malpractice.5
Although such a claim is traditionally asserted by the student
himself, a third party can assert that they were injured by the
school's negligent teaching of the student.' In Moss Rehab v.
White, the plaintiff motorists were injured when their car was
struck by a driver who had recently completed training at the
Moss Rehab School for the Disabled.7 The Supreme Court of
Delaware rejected the claim against the driving school on the
basis that although the plaintiffs were not actual students who
had studied with the defendant, their claims were nevertheless
barred as claims sounding in educational malpractice.'
2 Christensen v. S. Normal Sch., 790 So. 2d 252, 255 (Ala. 2001).
3 Vogel v. Maimonides Acad. of W. Conn., Inc., 754 A.2d 824, 828 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2000).
4 Lawrence v. Lorain Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 713 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998).
5 Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
6 See, e.g., Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902, 905 (Del. 1997).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 909.
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III. EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE
TRADITIONALLY DISFAVORED
Educational malpractice claims are traditionally disfavored by
the courts. To date, only Montana recognizes this tort as a cogni-
zable cause of action.9
In any negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that: (1)
the defendant owed him a duty; (2) the defendant breached
that duty; (3) the breach caused the plaintiffs damages; and (4)
the existence and extent of damages.o As to the first factor, the
existence of the duty owed by the defendant is a matter of law to
be determined by the court." For the reasons articulated below,
courts commonly decide that public policy prohibits them from
evaluating the existence and nature of the duty to educate.12
As seen in Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd., claims regarding the
quality of the education provided invariably entail a review of
the instructional materials and pedagogical methods em-
ployed.' 3 Moreover, this analysis invariably involves "a compre-
hensive review of a myriad of educational and pedagogical
factors, as well as administrative polices that enter into consider-
ation of whether the method of instruction . . . was appropri-
ate.""4 Such an undertaking is beyond the purview of the courts,
and as noted in Alsides, the "courts have refused to become
'overseers of both the day-to-day operation of [the] educational
process as well as the formulation of its governing policies.'""5
In doing so, the courts have declined to find a duty on the part
of educators, and have rendered claims for educational malprac-
tice nonviable.' 6 The concerns articulated by the court in Alsides
are well summarized in Page v. Klein Tools, Inc.:
(1) [T]he lack of a satisfactory standard of care by which to eval-
uate an educator;
(2) the inherent uncertainties about causation and the nature of
damages in light of such intervening factors as a student's
B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982).
10 See, e.g., Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995).
11 See id.
12 See Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. CIV. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103,
at *17 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).
13 Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
14 Id. at 472 (quoting Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996)).
15 Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582, 585
(1982)).
16 See Andre, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
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attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience, and
home environment;
(3) the potential for a flood of litigation against schools; and
(4) the possibility that such claims will "embroil the courts into
overseeing the day-to-day operations of schools."1 7
With these difficulties looming, courts commonly dispose of ed-
ucational malpractice cases by summary judgment on the basis
that there is simply "no legal duty upon which to premise the
claim of negligence."
As seen in some of the cases involving flight training, there is
some disagreement about the existence and extent of any duty
owed by an educator. However, educational malpractice cases
commonly present another fatal flaw: it is difficult to establish
causation." In a nutshell, it is virtually impossible to tell if the
defendant's instruction on a certain subject would have pre-
vented the plaintiffs damages. Moreover, even if the instruction
is adequate, there are a variety of reasons why the plaintiff might
not have learned the subject matter. For instance, the defendant
could be the best teacher in the world, but if the plaintiff does
not listen, does not apply himself, or is simply not able enough,
he or she will not learn the material.o
These concerns apply to bar educational malpractice claims
"against public schools, institutions of higher learning, or pri-
vate proprietary and trade schools."2 1 However, some states (par-
ticularly New York) have drawn a fundamental difference
between providers of general education (i.e., public schools)
and providers of specialized career training on the basis that the
sorts of public policy considerations inherent in assessing the
17 Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Mich. 2000) (quoting Alsides,
592 N.W.2d at 472).
18 Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int'l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2008).
19 See, e.g., Page, 610 N.W.2d at 904.
20 Although not usually an issue in aviation cases, it can also be extremely diffi-
cult to properly evaluate damages in educational malpractice claims, particularly
in cases brought by students against providers of general education. For example,
did the lost earning capacity result from a failure to educate properly? Such dam-
ages are extremely difficult to prove with any degree of certainty. See Sheesley v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., No. CIV. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103, at *17 (D.S.D. Apr.
20, 2006). But see Newman v. Socata SAS, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329-30 (M.D.
Fla. 2013).
21 Page, 610 N.W.2d at 905.
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general education of children were simply not present in a pri-
vately offered course of specialized career training.22
IV. TREATMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST
FLIGHT TRAINING PROVIDERS
Because pilot training is so important and the consequence of
poor training can be so catastrophic, the aviation world provides
fertile ground for cases sounding in educational malpractice.
Since nearly all states refuse to recognize claims sounding in ed-
ucational malpractice, claims asserted against flight training
providers are commonly barred by the educational malpractice
doctrine. In lawsuits where claims against flight training prov-
iders are allowed to proceed, the courts use a variety of tactics tojustify why the particular claim asserted by the plaintiff simply
does not constitute a claim of educational malpractice. 2 4 Analy-
sis of the leading cases follows.
A. SHEESLEY V. CESSNA AIRcRAFT Co. 25
This case involved a 1977 Cessna 340A aircraft that had un-
dergone series of upgrades to increase engine power.26 These
upgrades included aftermarket modifications to the turbo-
charger exhaust system, which were undertaken years before the
plaintiff purchased the aircraft. After purchasing the aircraft,
the plaintiff underwent flight training with FlightSafety, Inc.
The plaintiff received five days worth of classroom and flight
simulator training as part of this program.2 9 With regard to
emergency maneuvers, FlightSafety's curriculum included "only
the emergency procedures contained in the Pilot Operating
Handbook issued by Cessna for a 340A."so
The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff on August 22,
2000.3' Subsequent investigation revealed that a crack had devel-
oped in the turbocharger wastegate elbow, allowing super-
22 See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-MD-
2085, 2010 WL 5185106, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010).
23 See infra Parts IVA, W.C.
24 See infra Parts IV.B, W.D.
25 No. CIV. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).
26 Id. at *1.
27 Id.






heated gases to enter the engine assembly and vaporize the fuel,
thereby causing the left engine to stall. The pilot was unable to
compensate for the stalled engine and crashed.3 3
The plaintiffs sued both Cessna and FlightSafety.34 Of interest
here are the claims against FlightSafety. More specifically, the
plaintiffs "asserted a negligence claim contending that Flight-
Safety negligently trained [the pilot] by failing to include emer-
gency procedures relating to exhaust system failures in its
curriculum and by using a flight simulator that failed to accu-
rately replicate a Cessna 340A."15
The plaintiffs tried to have their claims characterized as com-
mon law negligence claims rather than generalized educational
malpractice claims by relying on Doe v. Yale University.36 In Doe, a
medical student in his residency program contracted HIV while
performing a risky medical procedure.3 7 He sued Yale "for negli-
gently failing to provide [him with] sufficient training" and for
negligently failing to supervise him while performing the proce-
dure.38 The Connecticut Superior Court determined that the
plaintiff had not implicated the defendant's overall educational
program or alleged that it had failed to teach him to be a good
doctor, and instead made out a precise common law negligence
claim based on a failure to educate him on the proper needle
technique and a failure to supervise the plaintiff as he practiced
needle technique during his residency."
In doing so, the Doe court analogized the plaintiffs situation
to that of an architectural student who successfully sued for neg-
ligent supervision when he was injured by a saw in the school
woodshop. 40 As can be seen throughout aviation cases involving
educational malpractice, Doe has encouraged plaintiffs to couch
their claims against educational institutions as specific acts of
negligence rather than a generalized attack on the quality of the
educational process and curriculum as a whole.4 '
32 Id.
3 Id. at *3.
3 Id.
35 Id. at *14.
36 No. CV 9003053655, 1997 WL 766845 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
3 Sheesley, 2006 WL 1084103, at *16.
38 Id.
Id. (quoting Doe, 1997 WL 766845, at *2).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., id.; Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900, 909-10 (Mich. 2000).
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However, the court in Sheesley rejected the arguments
presented in Doe." First, the court noted that the plaintiff in Doe
was able to recover because he was injured while still participat-
ing in the course of education. The plaintiff in Sheesley had al-
ready completed the course of education at the time the
accident occurred 4 4-the common fact setting in these cases.
Second, the court disagreed with Doe's differentiation be-
tween claims alleging a failure to educate on a specific topic ver-
sus claims attacking the quality of the educational process and
curriculum as a whole."5 "In both instances, the plaintiff is alleg-
ing that the school did not teach the student what he or she
needed to know."46 The court adroitly observed that:
The gravamen of plaintiffs claims are that FlightSafety negli-
gently trained [the pilot] by failing to provide him the skills nec-
essary to detect and safely land following an exhaust system
failure. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that FlightSafety negligently
created its curriculum by failing to include emergency proce-
dures relating to an exhaust system failure. Further, plaintiffs
contend that FlightSafety used negligent teaching techniques by
employing a simulator that does not accurately replicate the han-
dling of a Cessna 340A. In other words, plaintiffs are contesting
the substance and manner of FlightSafety's training. Plaintiffs'
claims "encompass the traditional aspects of education," and
thus, sound in educational malpractice.
Third, the court set forth the policy reasons for why the judi-
cial system was poorly equipped to adjudicate cases regarding
educational malpractice." The court noted the difficulty in "es-
tablishing the appropriate standard of care to evaluate flight
training schools," and noted that the "court would have to de-
cide '[h]ow much was [FlightSafety] required to teach.' " Ac-
cordingly, the court determined that "[s] chools, not courts, are
in a better position to determine what should be taught.""o The
court noted that should it pass judgment on the curriculum and
techniques used by FlightSafety, there would be "no principled
basis to stop it from determining what curriculum should be




46 Id. (citing Page, 610 N.W.2d at 905).
4 Id. (citing Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902, 905 (Del. 1997)).
- See id. at *17-18.




taught at medical schools, paramedic schools, commercial truck
driving schools, and innumerable other technical and higher
education facilities. "51
Since pilot error is a factor in many aviation accidents, the
court was concerned that "if the court recognizes educational
malpractice in this case, virtually every future plane crash will
raise the specter of negligent training against the flight school
or aviation training center," potentially leading to a flood of law-
suits. 2 The court also was concerned with the causation
problems inherent in educational malpractice claims: "Did the
school negligently train the student? Did the student pay atten-
tion? Was the student tired, ill, distracted? Too many factors
contribute to the quality of a student's education, and recogniz-
ing educational malpractice invites speculation [as to
causation]."
Although this was an issue of first impression in South Dakota,
the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota pre-
dicted that "the South Dakota Supreme Court [would] follow
the overwhelming majority rule and refuse to recognize educa-
tional malpractice as a cause of action" and granted Flight-
Safety's motion for summary judgment."
B. IN RE CESSNA 208 SERIES AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION"
This case involved the crash of a Cessna 208B (also known as a
Cessna Caravan) upon encountering in-flight icing conditions
near Parks, Arizona, on November 8, 2002.56 In June 2002, the
two pilots involved had attended FlightSafety's Cessna Caravan
Pilot Initial Course at the FlightSafety Cessna Learning Center
in Wichita, Kansas." Although the two pilots received slightly
different training (one was instrument rated, the other was not),
it was undisputed that both received instruction and flight simu-
lator training on how to handle icing conditions in the Cessna
Caravan.
51 Id. at *18.
52 Id. at *17.
53 Id.
54 Id. at *18.
55 546 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D. Kan. 2008).
56 Id. at 1156.
57 Id. at 1156-57.
58 Id. at 1157.
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The plaintiffs sued FlightSafety alleging that they had "(1)
negligently failed to instruct Cessna Caravan pilots on how to
avoid ice accumulation, how accumulation could affect aircraft
performance, or exercise reasonable care in performing flight
training services; (2) fraudulently failed to disclose information
about icing conditions in the Cessna Caravan; and (3) had
breached express and implied warranties concerning Flight-
Safety's training and the safety instructions and the aircraft
itself."59
The plaintiffs initially sued in the District Court of Tarrant
County, Texas.6 0 Cessna removed the case to U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred this case to U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas."
Prior to removal to federal court, FlightSafety made a motion
for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims
sounded in educational malpractice, and were not recognized
under Texas law. 6 2 The Tarrant County District Court Judge de-
nied the defendants' motion for summary judgment relying on
Doe and recognizing a "claim for breach of common law duty
not to cause physical injury by negligent conduct during the
course of instruction."6 8 This conclusion is somewhat puzzling,
and would make more sense if the accident had occurred during
the course of instruction, which it did not. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court also relied upon the dissent in Page, which
also recognized the difference between providing objectively in-
correct instruction on a particular subject versus a mere failure




62 Id. at 1157-58.
63 Id. at 1158.
64 Id. at 1158-59 (citing Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900, 909 (Mich.
2000) (Kelly, J., dissenting)). In her dissenting opinion in Page, Justice Kelly
opined that the "plaintiff asserted a distinct claim of negligence, i.e. that defen-
dant taught improper techniques for how to use a particular piece of equipment
for climbing utility poles, which did not fall within the disfavored realm of educa-
tional malpractice." Id. Justice Kelly also "distinguished the case from one involv-
ing general educational instruction and inquiry into the nuances of educational
theories. [The dissent] reasoned that based on the manufacturer's instructions
and user experience, the jury had a standard of care to ascertain whether the
specific technique which defendant taught was reasonable." Id. at 1159 (citing
Page, 610 N.W.2d at 909-10 (Kelly, J., dissenting)).
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Upon transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas, FlightSafety again moved for summary judgment.65 Dis-
trict Judge Kathryn H. Vratil determined that Judge Crosby's
earlier ruling "was a reasonable application of Texas law and is
supported by Doe v. Yale University and the dissenting opinion in
Page" and denied FlightSafety's motion for summary judgment
on the basis of the educational malpractice bar.66
However, the court did grant FlightSafety's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the breach of implied warranty claims. "An
implied warranty that services will be performed in a good and
workmanlike manner" applies only to cases involving "repair or
modification of existing tangible goods or property."6 7 Fore-
shadowing Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.,6" the plaintiffs
claimed that "FlightSafety flight training services were provided
in connection with a tangible good, i.e. FlightSafety training
materials which modified the Cessna Pilot Operating Hand-
book."69 The court disagreed, noting that "[f]light training
materials such as textbooks or guidelines are tangible goods, but
providing flight [education] services does not relate to the 're-
pair or modification' of those goods or of the Cessna Pilot Oper-
ating Handbook."7 0 The court declined to extend the implied
warranty of good and workmanlike performance, and granted
FlightSafety's motion for summary judgment on this point.7 1
C. DALIAs AIRMOTIVE, INc. v. FLIGHTSAFETY
INTERNATIONAL, INC.72
The factual scenario in Dallas Airmotive is similar to that in
Sheesley. In Dallas Airmotive, a mechanical defect in a component
part caused the plane's left engine to stall.75 Further mechanical
65 See id. at 1157.
66 Id. In determining that the plaintiffs had stated a distinct claim of negli-
gence (rather than a generalized attack on the quality of the education and cur-
riculum), the court also determined that the negligence claims against
FlightSafety were not barred by the federal preemption doctrine. See id. at
1159-61. Similarly, the court determined that state law remedies for breach of
express warranty were also not preempted by federal law. See id. at 1162-63.
67 Id. at 1161 (citing Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp.
Dist., 978 S.W.2d 50, 52-53 (Tex. 1998)).
68 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
69 In re Cessna, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 277 S.W.3d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
73 Id. at 698.
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failure prevented the pilot from being able to halt windmilling
or "feather" the propeller on the stalled engine.7 4 These
mechanical failures caused a high drag condition for which the
pilot was unable to compensate, and ultimately led to the crash
of the aircraft.
Families of the deceased pilot and passengers successfully
sued Dallas Airmotive, who had done maintenance work on the
engines before the accident.7 6 Dallas Airmotive sought contribu-
tion from FlightSafety, where the pilot had completed his turbo-
prop training only nine days before the accident.77 This training
consisted of both ground school and simulator training.78 Al-
though engine-out conditions were replicated in the simulator
program used, FlightSafety personnel admitted that prior to the
accident they were aware that the simulator did not properly
replicate the "high-drag forces associated with an unfeathered
propeller," and that the pilot experienced "unrealistically low
feedback as to the drag forces involved and their effect on the
airplane's handling."7 9
The plaintiff tried to rely on Doe and couch its claims as a
"very precise negligence claim," rather than a generalized attack
on the overall quality of the education.8 0 The plaintiff asserted
specific acts of negligence in FlightSafety's failure "to alert and
warn [the pilot] of the known dangers of shutting down an en-
gine in flight without the ability to properly feather the propel-
ler."8 ' Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that "FlightSafety
knew its . . . simulator did not accurately replicate the extreme
drag experienced and that it nonetheless continued to use the
simulator. "82
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs argu-
ment, observing that "[t]his is a case about the quality of the
instruction."" "The fact that FlightSafety was aware of the defi-
ciencies in its training program does not change the nature of




77 Id. at 698-99.
78 Id. at 698.
79 Id.
so Id. at 700.
81 Id.
82 Id.




tion that "FlightSafety failed to teach the pilot that which he
needed to know in the situation leading to the crash."" It went
on to note that Missouri had previously determined that "educa-
tional malpractice claims are not cognizable because there is no
duty," and examined the four policy concerns articulated in Page
in explaining why such claims are not cognizable. 6 Ultimately,
the court of appeals went on to affirm the district court's grant
of FlightSafety's motion for summary judgment."
D. IN RE AIR CRASH NEAR CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YoRK,
ON FEBRUARY 12, 20098
On February 12, 2009, Continental Connection Flight 3407
crashed upon approach to Buffalo Niagara International Air-
port, killing all forty-nine people aboard and one person on the
ground." Investigation revealed that this crash was likely caused
by the pilots' improper response to airframe ice accumulation.90
The ice accumulation slowed airspeed, nearly causing the plane
(a Bombardier Dash 8-Q400) to stall.91 The automatic anti-stall
system disconnected the autopilot and the stick pusher mecha-
nism nosed the aircraft down to gain airspeed. The pilots
fought this input and pitched the aircraft sharply up, exacerbat-
ing the stall and causing a catastrophic crash moments later. 3
The plaintiffs sued airlines Colgan Air, Inc., Pinnacle Airlines
Corp., Continental Airlines, Inc., and flight training provider
FlightSafety International, Inc.94 Of primary interest here are
the claims asserted against FlightSafety. 5 The plaintiffs made
both negligence and breach of contract claims against Flight-
Safety. The plaintiffs' negligence claim appeared to be a
straightforward claim of educational malpractice: FlightSafety
did not train the pilots "on how to use the stick pusher mecha-
nism in the Dash 8-Q400," and trained the pilots "using simula-
85 Id.
86 Id. at 699, 701.
87 Id. at 701.
88 No. 09-MD-2085, 2010 WL 5185106 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010).
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tors and equipment that did not accurately represent the
performance of the Dash 8-Q400.""6
Although initially sued out in New York state court, the de-
fendants removed the case to U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a) (1). 7
The plaintiffs made a motion for remand to state court, claim-
ing that the presence of FlightSafety destroyed complete diver-
sity and that their claims against FlightSafety were not
preempted by federal law."
The defendants opposed remand, claiming that the plaintiffs
had fraudulently joined FlightSafety in an effort to destroy com-
plete diversity.99 In order to determine if a party has been fraud-
ulently joined, the court must determine that "(1) the plaintiff
committed fraud in the pleadings, or (2) there is no possibility,
based on the pleadings, that the plaintiffs can state a cause of
action against the non-diverse party in state court."o First,
there was no evidence that the plaintiffs committed fraud in
their pleadings."o' Turning to the second prong of the test,
counsel for the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs claims
sounded in educational malpractice and were not cognizable
causes of action in New York.10 2
Thus, in order to determine if this case would stay in federal
court, the court was forced to examine the viability of educa-
tional malpractice claims under New York law.' In doing so,
the court acknowledged that in traditional settings, educational
malpractice claims were not cognizable under New York law for
the typical policy reasons.' 0 4
However, the court determined that "the specific policy con-
siderations underlying New York's educational malpractice deci-
sions are not present here to such a degree that this Court can
definitively conclude that Plaintiffs have no chance of success-
fully asserting their claims."'o In reaching this conclusion, the
96 Id. at *2.
9 Id. at *3.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir.
1998)).
lo See id. at *4.
102 Id. at *6.
103 Id. at *6-7.
104 Id. at *5 (citing Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440,
442-44 (N.Y. 1979)).
10 Id. at *6.
476
2014] EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 477
court analyzed a series of policy considerations. 10 First, the
court noted that FlightSafety's role in the educational process
was markedly different than traditional educational providers.o 7
FlightSafety was "a private corporation engaged in the business
of providing specialized training, thus a New York court may rea-
sonably determine that it is not being tasked with assessing 'the
validity of broad educational policies."'108 Second, the court de-
termined that since the world of commercial aviation instruc-
tion is fairly small, there was no threat of "a glut of suits
challenging the day-to-day implementation of educational poli-
cies."109 Third, the court noted that the state was not nearly as
involved in regulating specialized commercial educators, as it
was with regulating general providers of education. 1 o Thus, in-
tervention in this case would not "interfere in the constitutional
and statutory duties of state administrative agencies to adminis-
ter the public school system." 11 Finally, the court noted that
Donohue "explicitly stated that a cause of action resembling edu-
cational malpractice could possibly be pled within the strictures
of a traditional negligence or malpractice action."' 1 2 As such,
the court determined that the "educational malpractice bar
does not necessarily prevent the Plaintiffs from maintaining
their causes of action [against FlightSafety] in state court."1 '
In determining that the plaintiffs did not fraudulently join
FlightSafety and that remand to New York state court was appro-
priate, the court also found that the plaintiffs' breach of contract
claims stood a chance of success in state court.114 Additionally,
the court determined that state court remedies were not pre-
empted by federal law, and no federal question jurisdiction
existed."'
The court's treatment of the breach of contract claim in In re
Air Crash Near Clarence Center illuminates another potential ave-
nue to establish the liability of flight training providers. The
plaintiffs brought a breach of contract claim alleging that "the
passengers of Continental Connection Flight 6407 relied on
106 See id.
107 See id.




112 Id. at *7.
113 Id.
114 See id. at *7-8.
115 See id. at *8-11.
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FlightSafety's performance of its contractual obligations to Col-
gan, Pinnacle, and/or Continental, but that FlightSafety negli-
gently performed the flight training it was obligated to
provide.""' Furthermore, they alleged that they were entitled to
sue as the intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween FlightSafety and Colgan, Pinnacle, and/or Continental. 1 7
The court determined that under New York law, "a contrac-
tual obligation, standing alone, does not give rise to tort liability
in favor of a non-contracting third party.""" However, New York
law provides an exception "where the contracting party, in fail-
ing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties,
'[1]aunches a force or instrument of harm.""' 9 The court also
found that this claim stood a possibility of succeeding in New
York state court, further evidence that the joinder of Flight-
Safety was not fraudulent.12 0
While In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center appears to support
claims sounding in educational malpractice, it is important to
remember that this decision is concerned primarily with the
propriety of federal jurisdiction. The court's true holding is that
the plaintiffs' negligence and breach of contract claims against
FlightSafety were not necessarily prohibited by New York law, and
therefore joinder of FlightSafety was not fraudulent. Although
the court remanded this case to New York state court, the issue
of educational malpractice was not litigated in subsequent state
court action. 2 1
116 Id. at *2.
117 Id.
118 Id. at *7.
119 Id. (quoting Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 140
(N.Y. 2002)).
120 See id. at *8.
121 Subsequent litigation in this case generated debate about the proper stan-
dard of care for state law claims. See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on
Feb. 12, 2009, 798 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484-86 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). Through the adop-
tion of the Aviation Act, Congress had intended federal regulations to preempt
all state regulations in the air safety field, including state standards of care, al-
though under the Aviation Act's savings clause, "[s] tate law causes of action and
remedies remain available." See id. at 486 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c)). However,
the ruling in In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center may prove problematic to flight
education providers. If federal law preempts all state regulation regarding air
safety (by operation of field preemption), must the conduct of flight education
providers necessarily be measured against the federal standards enacted by Con-
gress? Neither the U.S. Code nor the Code of Federal Regulations contain any
language specifically regulating the conduct of flight educators.
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E. WAUGH V. MORGAN STANLEY & CO. 22
Waugh involved the crash of a Cessna 421B outside of Wheel-
ing, Illinois.'12 Although pilot Mark Turek was fully licensed and
had significant experience with twin-engine aircraft, he was rela-
tively new to the Cessna 421B.124 Approximately one month
prior to the accident, the pilot had received flight simulator
training through Arr-ow II, Inc. (Arr-ow), flight instruction from
Recurrent Flight Training Center, Inc. (Recurrent), and five
hours of flight observation from Howard Levinson, who was a
certified flight instructor and part owner of the accident
aircraft.'25
The defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that
the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the educational malpractice
doctrine.126 The trial court granted the defendants' motion,
concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were not cognizable, and
the plaintiffs appealed.127
The court quickly determined that the plaintiffs' claims were
in essence, an assertion that these defendants failed to train the
pilot what he needed to know in order to safely pilot and land
the plane.128 Although the dissent sought to classify these claims
as claims for ordinary negligence, the court found that they
"would require a jury at trial to analyze the quality and methods
of instruction provided to [the pilot], as well as an evaluation of
the course of instruction and the soundness of teaching
methods."'29
Having first determined that the claims sounded in educa-
tional malpractice, the court next set out to determine whether
or not such claims were cognizable under Illinois law, an issue of
first impression.'o The court noted that educational malprac-
tice claims were inherently beset with the policy and causation
issues as articulated in Alsides and Page.'"' The court examined
trends in case law around the country before deciding that
claims for educational malpractice were not cognizable under
122 966 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
123 Id. at 543-44.
124 Id. at 544.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 543.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 550.
130 Id. at 546.
131 Id. at 549.
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Illinois law. 13 2 In doing so, the court heavily relied on Dallas Air-
motive to show that claims revolving around the quality of flight
instruction provided were barred by the educational malpractice
doctrine.1 3 3
The court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on both In re Air
Crash Near Clarence Center and Doe.'3 The court noted that In re
Air Crash Near Clarence Center's holding (that there was a possibil-
ity that the educational malpractice bar might not apply in that
particular factual situation) was extremely limited.13' The court
also distinguished Doe, observing that the case at hand did not
involve "an injury sustained by a student during the course of
instruction from a danger created by the instructor."13 6
The plaintiffs also advanced the theory that the relationship
between Turek and Levinson "was 'much closer and immediate'
than that of an ordinary school and student," and that the edu-
cational malpractice bar should not apply."' The plaintiffs ar-
gued that Levinson did not provide any flight instruction on a
formal basis and, as such, their claims were not barred by the
educational malpractice doctrine.'13
The court disagreed, relying on Gloreigen v. Cirrus Design
Corp.13 1 for the proposition that no matter the precise labels ap-
plied to the parties, "whenever the defendant enter [s] into an
educational relationship" with the plaintiff, the educational mal-
practice bar applies.o The correct analysis, the court noted, is
"based on the nature of the claim [asserted against the defen-
dant] rather than the nature of the defendant."1 4 1 Ultimately,
the court determined that claims for educational malpractice
were not cognizable under Illinois law, and all claims against
flight education providers Arr-ow, Recurrent, and Levinson were
barred.142
However, Justice Pucinski wrote a dissenting opinion, con-
tending that the plaintiffs had asserted traditional negligence
claims, rather than claims sounding in educational malpractice,
132 Id.
133 Id.





139 796 N.W.2d 541, 554-55 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).





and that claims asserted against Levinson should not be prohib-
ited by the educational malpractice doctrine. 143 The dissent
noted that Levinson was not a traditional provider of flight train-
ing, and did not charge Turek for his services.14 4 Instead, Levin-
son conducted the observation flights because he had a vested
interest in doing so as part owner of the aircraft and to help
satisfy insurance coverage provisions.' 5
More specifically, the dissent pointed out that Section 323 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth a basis for liability
for a voluntary undertaking that is performed negligently:
§ 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liabil-
ity to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.' 46
According to Justice Pucinski, Section 323 could be used to de-
termine the duty that Levinson owed to Turek.14 7
The dissent also stated that Section 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts "provides for limited liability to third persons
based on the negligent performance of a service or undertaking
where the provision of the services results in physical harm." 4 8
Section 302A provides that defendants may be held liable for
harm caused by third parties when "[a] n act or an omission may
be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent
or reckless conduct of the other or a third person." 1 4 9 Finally,
the dissent pointed out that Section 390 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts creates liability when a defendant provides a
chattel for use by a third party known to be incompetent:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to






149 Id. at 558.
4812014]
482 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [79
know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or other-
wise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical
harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to
share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting to them.'5 o
The dissent used these sections of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts to argue to establish that the flight education was an
undertaking that was performed negligently, thereby causing in-
jury to the plaintiffs.15 1 In doing so, he disagreed with In re
Cessna's and Doe's findings that the plaintiffs must be injured by
a danger created by the instructor during the course of instruc-
tion, not after its completion.152 Such a finding "improperly
removes the well-established tort principles of foreseeablity and
proximate cause from the negligence analysis and would allow
parties to escape the foreseeable consequences of their negli-
gence."5 s Furthermore, the dissent noted that Section 324A
makes it clear that "liability may attach when the undertaking is
negligently performed and injures a third party later, after the
negligent actor is no longer present."15 4
Justice Pucinski determined that the plaintiffs had set out a
discrete claim of negligence against Levinson much like in In re
Cessna and Doe.'5 5 The plaintiff did not allege "a mere failure to
provide a better education," a generalized attack on the quality
of the education.'15 Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that " [w] hat
occurred in this case is that Levinson undertook to instruct
Turek and allowed Turek to fly Levinson's airplane, but negli-
gently failed to train him how to properly operate that specific
airplane."' Justice Pucinski observed that further application
of the educational malpractice bar in this case would set "bad
precedent in allowing owners and operators of aircrafts to avoid
liability for their failure to exercise reasonable care in training
and/or allowing others to fly their airplanes."'5 Justice Pucinski










2014] EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 483
curred under the guise of providing instructions or training
does not vitiate liability for ordinary negligence."15'
F. MuRPHY v. CYRus DESIGN CORP.'60
Murphy involved a Cirrus SR-22 aircraft that encountered in-
flight icing conditions and crashed near Cleveland, Ohio, on
April 28, 2009.161 The pilot, Michael H. Doran, had purchased
the aircraft in 2008, and as part of the purchase agreement he
received transition training from Cirrus, subcontracted out to
the University of North Dakota Aerospace Foundation (UN-
DAF).' 6 2 After completing transition training in October 2009,
he received ongoing flight instruction from Steven Kaplan, a
certified Cirrus Standardized Instructor Pilot in Buffalo, New
York. 163
Murphy's procedural posture is virtually identical to that in In
re Air Crash Near Clarence Center.1'6 4 The plaintiffs sought remand
claiming that theirjoinder of flight instructor Steven Kaplan de-
stroyed complete diversity, thereby necessitating remand to state
court.'16 In response, the defendants argued that Kaplan had
been fraudulently joined solely to destroy diversity jurisdiction,
and any claims against him asserted in state court would necessa-
rily fail.' 6 6
In determining the validity of claims against flight training
providers, the court heavily relied on the ruling from In re Air
Crash Near Clarence Center for the proposition that "a New York
court may find that the commercial specialized training of air-
men is not necessarily akin to the general education of children,
and is unlikely to result in a glut of suits challenging the imple-
mentation of educational policies."16 V The court relied on Clar-
ence Center for the proposition that "the New York Court of
Appeals has explicitly stated that a cause of action resembling
educational malpractice could possibly be pled within the stric-
tures of a traditional negligence or malpractice action."'" The
15 Id.
160 No. 11-CV-4955, 2012 WL 729263 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012).
161 Id. at *1.
162 Id.
163 Id.
16 Id. at *2.
165 Id. at *1.
166 Id.
167 Id. at *2.
168 Id.
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court determined that the plaintiffs' claims against Kaplan could
possibly (though not certainly) succeed, and ordered remand to
New York state court.'6 9
It does not appear that the educational malpractice issue was
further litigated following remand to state court. In the wake of
In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center and Murphy, the New York
courts continue to hold out the possibility that negligence
claims asserted against flight training providers may be cogniza-
ble under New York law, at least to stave off claims of fraudulent
joinder.
G. GLORVIGEN V. CIRRus DESIGN CoRP.170
Pilot Gary Prokop purchased a Cirrus SR22 aircraft in Decem-
ber 2002.171 Mr. Prokop was a relatively inexperienced pilot but
had earned the high performance endorsement necessary to pi-
lot the SR22.' 72 However, he was not instrument flight rated and
was only licensed to fly under visual flight rules (VFR).178 On
January 18, 2003, Prokop took off under visual flight condi-
tions.'7 Shortly after takeoff, he entered instrument meterologi-
cal conditions (IMC), became disoriented, and crashed, killing
himself and one passenger.'7 5
As part of the purchase contract, the manufacturer/seller,
Cirrus, agreed to provide Prokop with two days of transition
training, although such services were subcontracted out to the
UNDAF.171 This transition training consisted of five separate les-
sons, each with a classroom component and actual in-flight in-
struction practicing certain maneuvers.1 7 7 Students' progress
through the five-lesson curriculum was noted on a checklist, and
flight instruction personnel graded each student's performance
16 Murphy also raised issues about the agency relationship between the Cirrus
defendants and the flight instructor Steven Kaplan. See id. at *4. The defendants
argued that Kaplan was not a proper party, and his acts should be attributed to
the Cirrus defendants. Id. at *3. However, under New York law, "it is well settled
that an agent can be held liable for his own negligent acts," and the court deter-
mined that Kaplan had been properly joined. Id. (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Morris Assocs., P.C., 200 A.D.2d 728, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)).
170 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
171 Id. at 576.
172 Id. at 575.
173 Id. at 576.
174 Id. at 577.
175 Id. at 578.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 576.
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on each of the five lessons as unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfac-
tory, or excellent."'
Of particular interest here is "Flight Lesson 4a," which taught
the "[r] ecovery from VFR into IMC (auto-pilot assisted)."' This
lesson was designed to instruct non-instrument rated pilots on
proper procedure when inadvertently entering instrument flight
conditions while aloft." Upon entering instrument flight con-
ditions, VFR-only pilots were instructed to activate the autopilot
and execute a 180-degree turn in order to return to visual flight
conditions.18 1 This procedure was set out in the Pilot's Operat-
ing Handbook and the Autopilot Operating Handbook, which
were provided to Prokop.1 8 2 Additionally, this procedure was de-
scribed in the Cirrus SR22 Training Manual, along with associ-
ated diagrams, which were also provided to Prokop.18 3 It was
undisputed that this procedure was taught as part of the class-
room curriculum, and was detailed on a series of Microsoft
PowerPoint slides exhibited to students during the classroom
session. 184
Finally, flight instructors were supposed to practice this ma-
neuver with students during flight instruction and grade their
performance. 8" Cirrus/UNDAF flight instructor Yu Weng
Shipek testified that he had practiced this maneuver with
Prokop. 18 6 However, a review of Prokop's course syllabus and
pilot's log revealed that this maneuver was not checked off as
completed and no grade was entered.1 8 7 According to the sylla-
bus itself, a failure to check off a particular maneuver indicated
that that lesson had been skipped or left incomplete at the in-
structor's discretion.1 8 8
The plaintiffs brought suit against Cirrus and UNDAF on
traditional negligence and product liability theories.s18 These
claims alleged that "Cirrus had a duty to train Prokop by virtue
of including transition training as part of the purchase price of
178 Id. at 576-77.
179 Id. at 577.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 578.
183 Id. at 577.
184 Id. at 577-78.
185 Id. at 578.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 577.
189 Id. at 578-79.
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the SR22." 9 o The case was tried to a jury in Minnesota state
court."' The jury allocated fault as: Prokop 25%, Cirrus 37.5%,
and UNDAF 37.5%, with damages totaling $19,400,000.192
Following the adverse jury verdict, the Cirrus defendants
brought a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the
district court denied."' The defendants appealed, and the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals determined that defendants Cirrus and
UNDAF were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
the claims asserted against them were prohibited by the educa-
tional malpractice doctrine. 9 4 The plaintiffs appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota on the theory that their claims truly
sounded in product liability rather than educational malpractice
and were not barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. 19 5
It is settled Minnesota law that educational malpractice claims
are prohibited.9 6 As shown by other cases, public policy argu-
ments militate against imposing a duty to educate effectively.19 7
Accordingly, the plaintiffs took pains to avoid characterizing
their claims as simply assertions that the defendants did not
teach the pilot what he needed to know.'" To get around the
educational malpractice doctrine bar, the plaintiffs attempted to
couch their claim as either a products liability action or as negli-
gence in a voluntary undertaking. 9 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court began by examining the plain-
tiffs' products liability theory. 200 The plaintiffs alleged that "Cir-
rus and UNDAF owed a duty to Prokop and Kosak to give Flight
Lesson 4a because, as a supplier and manufacturer, Cirrus owed
a duty to give adequate instructions in the safe use of its air-
plane."o2 0 Under Minnesota product liability law, failure to warn
claims are treated much like a typical negligence claim.2 0 2 As
190 Id.




195 Id. at 584.
196 See Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
197 See id.
198 See Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578.
199 Id. at 579.
200 Id. at 581.
201 Id. at 580.
202 See Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Minn. 1982) ("As a
practical matter, where the strict liability claim is based on . .. failure to warn ...
there is essentially no difference between strict liability and negligence.").
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such, the court must determine the existence and nature of duty
as a matter of law before submitting the case to the jury.203
In Minnesota, "a supplier has a duty to warn end users of a
dangerous product if it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury
could occur in its use."a This duty to warn actually comprises
two separate duties "(1) [t]he duty to give adequate instructions
for safe use; and (2) the duty to warn of dangers inherent in
improper usage."20 ' To be sufficient, the warnings should "(1)
attract the attention of those that the product could harm; (2)
explain the mechanism and mode of injury; and (3) provide in-
structions on ways to safely use the product to avoid injury."20 6
Practically, this means affixing warning signs and providing pur-
chasers with literature detailing proper usage.2 0 7
Instead, the plaintiffs sought to expand the manufacturer's
duty to warn to include a duty to properly train purchasers on
proper product usage. 2 08 The Minnesota Supreme Court was
quick to point out that:
[T]here is no duty for suppliers or manufacturers to train users
in safe use of their product. Indeed, imposing a duty to train
would be wholly unprecedented. Appellants cite no case-from
any court-in which a supplier or manufacturer was obligated to
provide training in order to discharge its duty to warn.209
As such, the court declined to extend the duty to warn to in-
clude a duty to train.21 0 Further, the materials that Cirrus undis-
putedly provided to Prokop21' "(1) attract[ed] the attention of
those that the product could harm; (2) explain [ed] the mecha-
nism and mode of injury; and (3) provide [d] instructions on
ways to safely use the product to avoid injury. "212 This led the
203 Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Minn. 1986).
204 Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004).
205 Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1977).
206 Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 274.
207 See id.
208 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Cirrus provided Prokop with descriptions of emergency maneuvers upon
inadvertently entering icing conditions in the Pilot's Operating Handbook,
Autapilot's Operating Handbook, and Cirrus SR22 Training Manual, which were un-
disputedly provided to Prokop. Id. at 576. It was also undisputed that this proce-
dure was taught as part of the classroom curriculum, and was detailed on a series
of Microsoft PowerPoint slides exhibited to students during the classroom ses-
sion. Id. at 577.
212 Id. at 583.
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court to determine that Cirrus had "adequately discharged its
duty to warn."213
In the alternative, the plaintiffs claimed that "Cirrus may have
assumed a duty to provide Flight Lesson 4a by undertaking to
provide the lesson." 2 14 It is settled law that "one who voluntarily
assumes a duty must exercise reasonable care . . . or he will be
responsible for damages resulting from his failure to do sO."215
However, Minnesota law also provides that there can be no tort
liability when the duty allegedly breached arises solely in con-
tract: "When a contract provides the only source of duties be-
tween the parties, Minnesota law does not permit the breach of
those duties to support a cause of action in negligence."2 1 6
In this case, the court already determined that a manufac-
turer's duty to warn does not include a duty to train and that
"Cirrus does not owe a duty imposed by law to provide Flight
Lesson 4a."'2 1  Instead, the duty to provide Flight Lesson 4a
"could only have arisen from the contract," thereby prohibiting
the plaintiffs from recovering in tort.21 ' The Minnesota Su-
preme Court thus affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals,
and found that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the educa-
tional malpractice doctrine.*2*
Two justices dissented largely on the basis that Cirrus's deci-
sion to provide training constituted a voluntary undertaking,
which must be performed with due care.2 2 0 Although the major-
ity correctly stated that "when the gravamen of [a] case . . . is
contractual" and "[a]ny duties between the parties arose out of
contracts," then "a party cannot be held liable in negligence,"
the dissent noted that the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaints
213 Id.
214 Id. at 584.
215 Isler v. Burman, 232 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Minn. 1975).
216 United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Les-
meister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 1983)).
217 Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 584.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 585 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson also argued that the
adequacy of the warning was a question for the jury. Id. In Justice Anderson's
opinion, the jury found that Cirrus's warning was inadequate by initially re-
turning a verdict that Cirrus was negligent. Id. Accordingly, it was inappropriate




sounded in tort (not contract), and that Cirrus's duty to warn
arose in tort (not contract).221
The dissent relied heavily on Section 323 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides that a party can assume a
duty in tort even if undertaken for consideration:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liabil-
ity to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.222
According to the dissent, "[t] hat a person can undertake a duty
in tort 'for consideration' indicates that a person can assume a
duty in tort through contract. "223 This conclusion is supported
by Minnesota contractual law, which provides for recovery in
tort despite the existence of a contractual relationship when the
alleged damages include personal injury or non-economic
loss. 2
Relying on Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as well as 80 S. Eighth Street, the dissent disagreed with the major-
ity's ruling that any duty owed by Cirrus was purely contractual
and recovery in tort was prohibited.2 In short, "a party should
not be 'immunize [d] ... from tort liability for his wrongful acts,'
just because those acts 'grow out of' or are 'coincident' to a
contract."22 1
The dissent contended that the duty owed by Cirrus was im-
posed by both contract and tort law, and involved personal in-
jury and non-economic-loss damages.227 The dissent concluded
that "by promising to provide Flight Lesson 4a, Cirrus did as-
221 Id. (citing Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 102).
222 Id. at 587-88.
223 Id. at 588 (citing Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674
(Minn. 2001); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493-94 (Minn.
1996)).
224 See 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. P'ship v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1992).
225 Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 587 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 589 (citing Eads v. Marks, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (Cal. 1952)).
227 Id. at 588.
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sume a duty in tort and may be held liable for breaching that
duty." 228
H. NEwMAN v. SOCATA SAS 229
Newman involved the February 2007 crash of a Socata TBM
700B following a missed approach to New Bedford Regional Air-
port in Massachusetts, which killed pilot Michael Milot and two
passengers. 2 3 0 Following the missed approach, Milot applied full
power for a go-around for the landing.231 The application of full
power caused a torque roll to the left, for which the TBM 700B
had a known propensity. 232 The torque roll caused Milot to lose
control of the aircraft and crash.
Seven months prior to the accident, Milot had received train-
ing from Simcom International, Inc. 4 Although Milot success-
fully completed the training and was fully licensed to fly the
TBM 700, the plaintiffs alleged that Simcom did not "warn him
of the TBM 700's known propensity to torque roll when engine
power is increased."2 3 5 At the time the accident occurred, at
least fifteen accidents involving torque roll in TBM 700 had
been reported to the National Transportation Safety Board and
the United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch. 2 3 6 The
plaintiffs alleged that "Simcom owed a duty to warn Mr. Milot of
the TBM 700's known propensity to torque roll and to otherwise
competently train him regarding flying that type of aircraft,"
and that "Simcom breached its duty by failing to inform and
warn Mr. Milot of the propensity of the TBM 700 to torque roll,"
which presented a foreseeable risk of harm.
The case was sued out in the U.S. District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida, which was to apply substantive Florida
law.23 8 Defendants Socata and Simcom moved to have the plain-
tiffs' claims dismissed on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims
228 Id.
229 924 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2013).




234 Id. at 1323-24.
235 Id. at 1323.




sounded in educational malpractice and were not cognizable
under Florida law."
The court began with the proposition that educational mal-
practice claims are prohibited under Florida law.2 40 Prior deci-
sions revolved around sovereign immunity, rendering the court
unable to pass judgment on policy level decisions made by other
branches of government. 2 4 1 These decisions also refer to (but do
not rely on) the policy considerations seen in other cases involv-
ing education providers: difficulty in ascertaining the applicable
standards of care, causation problems, and the potential of a
flood of litigation threatening to deeply embroil the courts in
the day-to-day operation of schools.2 4 2 Florida courts have also
found that these sorts of considerations also bar educational
malpractice claims asserted against private providers of general
241education.m
However, in Newman,m the court determined that Simcom
played a markedly different role than a typical provider of edu-
cation. More specifically,
[a] lowing the claims at issue-that a for-profit commercial en-
tity, teaching a narrowly-structured course on the operation of a
specific type of aircraft, owed a breached a duty to warn and train
regarding a known lethal propensity of the aircraft to torque
roll-to proceed does not implicate the public policy concerns
expressed in BJM. or other cases imposing the bar.245
In reaching this decision, the court heavily relied on both In re
Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liability Litigation and In re Air
Crash Near Clarence Center.24 6 In its own words, "[t] he public pol-
icy considerations that are relied upon to bar traditional educa-
tional malpractice claims do not carry over to the flight training
setting, at least not on the facts of this case."247
Instead, "it is likely that Florida courts would find sound pol-
icy reasons for allowing the claims against Simcom-founded on
239 Id. at 1323.
240 See Tubell v. Dade Cnty. Pub. Sch., 419 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); see also Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906,
914 (Fla. 1995).
241 Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
242 Id. at 1326.
243 See Armstrong v. Data Processing Inst., Inc., 509 So. 2d 1298, 1299 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
244 Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 1328.
247 Id.
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traditional common law causes of action-to proceed."2 4 8 More-
over, "Simcom has not explained why Florida courts, which have
long recognized negligence actions based on failure to warn,
would not allow these claims to move forward," and denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss. 24 9 Note that the court merely de-
nied the defendants' motion to dismiss on the premise the
plaintiffs' claims may stand a chance of success under Florida
law.2 50
V. THE CURRENT STATUS OF EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST
FLIGHT TRAINING PROVIDERS
As noted above, cases against flight training providers go both
ways, with a trend toward barring these claims.25 1 Sheesley, Dallas
Airmotive, and Waugh flatly prohibit educational malpractice
claims against flight training providers.5 2 In each, the court
notes the difficulties in assessing educational curriculum and
techniques, policy level concerns in regulating education, and
causation problems that simply render such disputes unfit for
judicial resolution. Glorvigen similarly holds that claims about
the quality of flight training cannot be couched as failure-to-
warn type products liability claims. 5 Manufacturers have a duty
to warn, but no duty to train.254
Future claims will likely continue to recast claims against
flight trainers as distinct acts of negligence (a failure to educate
on operation of stick-shakers, a failure to warn about a known
propensity for torque roll, etc.) rather than a generalized attack
on the overall quality of the course of training.255 To date, the
courts have rejected this distinction: both claims reduce to an
248 Id. at 1330.
249 Id.
250 Newman also discussed the difficulties in determining damages in the typi-
cal educational malpractice action (i.e., how do you measure damages stemming
from a failure to properly educate a child?). Id. at 1322. Such concerns were not
present in this case; however, the damages occasioned by Simcom's alleged fail-
ure to train were readily ascertainable. Id. at 1329.
251 See, e.g., Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. CIV. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL
1084103, at *14 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006); Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966
N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int'l,
Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
252 See cases cited supra note 251.
253 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 581 (Minn. 2012).
254 Id. at 582.
255 See, e.g., Newman, 942 F. Supp. at 1322; In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr.
N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, 798 F. Supp. 2d 481 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
492 [79
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
assertion that the student did not learn what he or she needed
to know.25 6 As in Sheesley, these claims will also continue to be
undermined by the fact that they typically arise after the pilot has
completed his training and is no longer actively involved in the
course of educational studies.2 5 7
In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center as well as the dissents in
Waugh and Glorvigen provide some interesting (if not convo-
luted) analyses about flight training providers' tort liability grow-
ing out of contractual relationships, voluntary undertakings,
entrusting a dangerous instrumentality to an inexperienced
user, and the duties owed to third parties under tort and con-
tract law.258 Although these theories are not widely accepted,
they do represent alternative ways for thinking about the poten-
tial liability of flight training providers. It remains to be seen if
the courts will use the traditional educational malpractice bar to
ban claims asserted under these theories.2 5 9
In all cases where claims of educational malpractice were not
dismissed out of hand (In re Cessna, Clarence Center, Murphy, and
Newman), it is important to look at what exactly the court was
asked to decide and the extent of the court's ruling.26 0 In each
of these cases, the courts determined that the plaintiffs' claims
against flight training providers were not necessarily barred and
may be cognizable by applicable state law, allowing the plaintiffs
to stave off motions to dismiss, claims of fraudulent joinder, or
motions for summary judgment.26 1 It does not appear that this
issue was fully litigated at trial in any of these cases.2 6 2
256 Sheesley, 2006 WL 1084103, at *16.
257 Id. at *31.
258 In re Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-MD-2085,
2010 WL 5185106, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010); see Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at
585; see Waugh, 966 N.E.2d at 557.
259 See Newman v. Socata SAS, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2013); Murphy
v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 11-CV-495S, 2012 WL 729263 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
2012); In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, 798 F. Supp. 2d
481 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liab. Litig., 546 F.
Supp. 2d 1153 (D. Kan. 2008).
260 See cases cited supra note 259.
261 See cases cited supra note 259.
262 See cases cited supra note 259.
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VI. SHOULD EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
ASSERTED AGAINST FLIGHT TRAINING
PROVIDERS BE RECOGNIZED?
At present, the majority of states have determined that educa-
tional malpractice claims should be barred as a matter of law for
the sorts of policy reasons articulated in Page.2" The courts have
imposed a blanket prohibition on all claims involving the suffi-
ciency of educational services and are either unable or unwilling
to adjudicate these disputes.26 4 Continued reliance on this sort
of reasoning certainly leads to consistent and predictable out-
comes in cases involving deficient education. But does this con-
tinued rejection of educational malpractice claims lead to the
right outcome? Does the mere mention of claims involving the
sufficiency of educational services provided automatically mean
that the claim is not fit for judicial resolution? Are all educa-
tional malpractice claims inherently nonjusticable?
Ideally, the educational malpractice bar should be construed
as a defense to unsolvable policy-level problems regarding the
generalized and compulsory education of schoolchildren. These
cases do not involve a foreseeable risk of physical harm, but are
in essence claims that the educator did not provide the child
with skills to develop into a successful adult. The courts would
have to make decisions about what should or should not be
taught in schools, decisions that are truly better left to other
branches of government. Claims involving the sufficiency of cur-
riculum and pedagogical techniques would indeed embroil the
courts in the day-to-day operations of schools, and could easily
result in a flood of litigation from disaffected students. With
thorny philosophical questions regarding the very goal of such
generalized education, it becomes nearly impossible to cogently
discuss the standards of conduct for educators, the breach
thereof, the nature of damages, and any causal link between
them. Accordingly, it is appropriate to bar the claims of plain-
tiffs who complain about the quality of education received in
public schools or other provider of generalized education.
But applying this sort of blanket prohibition to all claims in-
volving the provision of educational services is overbroad. Al-
though the issue of educational malpractice was not formally
litigated through trial in In re Cessna, In re Air Crash Near Clarence
Center, Murphy, and Newman, these cases may signal a trend to-
263 Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Mich. 2000).
26 See cases cited supra note 251.
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wards establishing liability for flight training providers. 265 Each
of these cases contained hints that claims alleging that a flight
training provider failed to teach the pilot what he or she needed
to know may succeed in certain circumstances. 266
In In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, Murphy, and Newman, the
courts seemed to buy into the notion that the commercial edu-
cation of aviators is fundamentally different from the public ed-
ucation of schoolchildren. 267 Cases involving commercial flight
training (or other specialized course of technical training teach-
ing a discrete set of safety-critical skills) simply do not present
the sort of unsolvable policy-level issues that were articulated in
Page.268 The typical issues-determining the appropriate stan-
dard of care, causation, and damages, as well as the conservation
of judicial resources and constitutional separation of powers-
just do not weigh heavily enough to warrant the outright prohi-
bition of claims asserted against such training providers.
Developing the standard of care and evaluating curriculum
and pedagogical techniques among flight trainers is not an un-
manageable task. Although the courts rightly do not want to
wade into assessing the sufficiency of generalized education pro-
vided to schoolchildren and undergraduates for a variety of pol-
icy reasons, they can and should be able to competently evaluate
the conduct of "a for-profit commercial entity, teaching a nar-
rowly structured course on the operation of a specific type of
aircraft" or other specialized equipment or training. 69 While it
may be difficult to determine what a school child or college stu-
dent must be taught, it certainly is not hard to determine that
there are discrete principles and skills that a pilot must be
taught in order to safely fly an airplane. A failure to competently
teach these skills may present a foreseeable risk of physical
harm, a key difference from cases involving the general educa-
tion of schoolchildren.2 70
265 See generally Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1322; Murphy, 2012 WL 729263, at
*3; In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., 798 F. Supp. 2d at 481; In re Cessna, 546 F.
Supp. 2d at 1153.
266 See cases cited supra note 265.
267 See Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1328; Murphy, 2012 WL 729263, at *2; In re
Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., 798 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
268 Page, 610 N.W.2d at 907.
269 Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
270 The proper measure of damages is also difficult to measure in cases involv-
ing the generalized education of schoolchildren however, the damages in avia-
tion accidents typically consist of personal injury and property damage. These
damages are relatively easy to calculate. See id.
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Taking Dallas Airmotive as an example, there is no compelling
policy reason why the court would not be able to assess the con-
duct of a flight trainer who trained students with a simulator it
knew to be inaccurate. It does not take much imagination to
envision other similar cases involving a flight instructor's failure
to adequately instruct a student on basic fundamental skills and
principles of flight. Looking beyond flight instruction and into
other fields of specialized education, analysis of Page reveals that
there is no compelling policy reason why the court was unfit to
adjudicate the claims of a telephone lineman who claimed that
the educator failed to teach him safe pole climbing tech-
nique. 7 It is not hard to see that such a defendant did not use
reasonable care in providing instruction to prevent against a
clearly foreseeable risk of falls. 7 In the face of such shortcom-
ings, defendants should not be able to assert the educational
malpractice bar to shield themselves from obviously negligent
conduct. If educational malpractice claims were recognized, air-
craft accidents are infrequent enough that it is unlikely that suits
against flight training providers would clog the courts.
It should be acknowledged that the recognition of these
claims would also have repercussions outside of the world of avi-
ation training. If plaintiffs may recover from flight schools, they
should theoretically also be able to recover from other "for-
profit commercial entit[ies], teaching a narrowly structured
course on the operation of a specific [piece of equipment]" or a
specific set of well defined skills.2 7 ' Although recognition of
such claims may expand the courts' role somewhat, there is no
reason why the courts would be unable to competently adjudi-
cate a defendant's failure to provide adequate training on a dis-
crete set of safety-critical skills, particularly when there is an
easily foreseeable risk of physical harm. Such claims should not
be turned away at the courthouse door simply because they
might burden the court system.
Recognizing claims regarding "for-profit commercial en-
tit[ies], teaching a narrowly structured course on the operation
of a specific [piece of equipment]" or a discrete set of safety-
critical skills does not mean that such claims will often suc-
271 Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int'l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2008).
272 See Page, 610 N.W.2d at 900.
273 See id.
274 Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
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ceed."6 Plaintiffs will still have the burden of proof on all ele-
ments of a negligence-based claim in order to recover. Plaintiffs
asserting claims against defendant flight instructors may have
difficulty convincing ajury that the harm that occurred was truly
foreseeable or that there is any causal link between the flight
educator's actions and the occurrence of the accident. These
factors will likely be difficult to prove in light of the vagaries of
student aptitude, focus, and application. Aviation-specific factors
such as dynamic weather, equipment failure, and pilot fatigue
may also pose issues.
However, it is not impossible for a plaintiff to make out such a
claim.27 6 By initially returning a verdict for $19 million, the jury
in Glorvigen clearly thought that the defendant flight training
provider was negligent in its failure to instruct on inadvertent
entry into instrument flight conditions, which presented a fore-
seeable risk of harm.2 7 7
The acknowledged downside to the recognition of flight-train-
ing malpractice claims is that flight trainers will be forced to de-
fend such claims, rather than having them dismissed as a matter
of law. Flight trainers will be forced to bear the (not insubstan-
tial) cost of defending these lawsuits, although it may be difficult
for a plaintiff to actually recover on such a claim. There is poten-
tial long-tail liability for flight schools as long as the given pilot is
still active in flying, which may threaten flight training facilities'
long-term financial stability. However, the strength of this causal
relationship greatly diminishes as time goes along. A jury will
likely have a hard time finding a positive causal relationship be-
tween the allegedly deficient training and an accident occurring
decades later.
The temporal nature of the causal relationship should also
weigh in favor of the imposition of liability for accidents occur-
ring shortly after the course of education is concluded. Cur-
rently, the law on educational malpractice imposes artificial and
illogical temporal restraints on an injured plaintiffs ability to
recover from flight training providers: injured plaintiffs may re-
cover from negligent flight training providers if injury occurs
during the course of flight training under a negligent supervi-
sion of training theory,27" but not if it occurs after training is
275 Id.
276 See Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Minn. 2012).
277 Id.
278 See supra note 1.
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concluded." If cases involving injuries occurring during the
course of training are permitted, why should claims involving
foreseeable harm occurring after the conclusion of the educa-
tion be prohibited? The end of training is no magic talisman; if
a failure to provide safety-critical pieces of instruction presents
foreseeable risk of harm, it should not matter if the harm occurs
during training or afterward.
At the very least, Glorvigen'" shows that cases with appropriate
measures of proof on all elements should at least be allowed to
go to a jury for such determinations, like any other negligence-
based case.28 ' They should not be screened out as a matter of
law on the fallacious assumption that the court system is simply
unable to adjudicate such matters. The courts pass judgment on
defendants' conduct every day; they determine if a defendant's
actions in the face of foreseeable risks of harm were reasonable
under the circumstances. An evaluation of the conduct of flight
trainers should be no different. The courts should be able to
determine if the duty of reasonable care would require the flight
trainer to provide specific pieces of instruction.
In light of the unavoidable truth that certain fields (such as
aviation) require the provision of adequate instruction in order
to prevent foreseeable personal injury or property damage, the
courts' traditional refusal to evaluate the sufficiency of educa-
tional curriculum or pedagogical techniques is unpersuasive. To
flatly bar negligent-training claims as a matter of law is a grave
disservice to plaintiffs who have suffered grievous injury as a re-
sult of patently defective training. If nothing else, these claims
should be allowed to proceed to a jury. Plaintiffs may not often
be able to succeed, but justice requires that they be given a
chance.
VII. CONCLUSION
As seen in Sheesley, Dallas Airmotive, Waugh, and Glorvigen, edu-
cational malpractice claims remain disfavored. The courts have
routinely found that they are incapable of assessing claims in-
volving the sufficiency of curriculum or pedagogical techniques
for a variety of practical and policy reasons. Creative plaintiffs'
279 See, e.g., Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. CIV. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL
1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20. 2006); Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Gloreigen, 816 N.W.2d at 572; Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. Flight-
Safety Int'l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
280 Gloruigen, 816 N.W.2d at 575.
281 See id.
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lawyers have avoided making generalized critiques of the quality
of the training by pointing to specific identifiable negligent acts
on the part of the flight instructor, but these claims have not
seen much success. Tort recovery against flight training provid-
ers based on products liability theories, liability for a voluntary
undertaking, and contractual law have not fared much better.
However, In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, Murphy, and New-
man stand for the proposition that claims against flight training
providers should be treated differently. The sorts of policy rea-
sons typically raised by courts when declining to adjudicate edu-
cational malpractice claims ring hollow when considering claims
against flight training providers or other "for-profit commercial
entit[ies], teaching a narrowly structured course on the opera-
tion of a specific [piece of equipment]" or a specific set of well
defined safety-critical skills."8 The courts should be able to com-
petently adjudicate cases involving objective failures to provide
discrete pieces of safety-critical instruction that pose a foresee-
able risk of harm.
Although it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove such a
case, they should at least be allowed the opportunity to do so.
Factual scenarios giving rise to liability against a flight training
providers are not inconceivable, and if the plaintiff is able to
make out such a claim, it should be allowed to proceed before a
jury for adjudication. As seen in Glorvigen, jurors have proven
receptive to such theories.2 8 3 The courts should not substitute
their own judgment for the jury's by determining that flight
training claims are barred as a matter of law. Such a categorical
rejection robs deserving plaintiffs of their right of recover
against truly negligent actors.
282 Newman, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
283 See Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 572.
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